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Abstract	
This	 paper	 analysed	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 emergence	 and	 consolidation	 of	 a	
postneoliberal	 political	 program	 and	 alliance	 –	 Kirchnerism	 –	 and	 penal	 policies	 in	
Argentina.	Three	key	moments	are	identified	in	this	recent	period.	After	the	experience	of	
an	intense	punitive	turn	during	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	Kirchnerist	political	alliances	
tried	to	deploy	a	progressive	political	discourse	and	agenda	on	penal	issues.	Nevertheless,	
this	initially	coincided	with	a	strong	wave	of	penal	populism	‘from	below’	that	continued	
the	precedent	trend	towards	increasing	punitiviness.		Since	2005,	and	for	a	brief	moment,	
this	 tendency	stopped.	However,	after	 that	and	during	 the	presidencies	of	Fernandez	de	
Kirchner	a	more	volatile	and	contradictory	scenario	was	generated.	The	incarceration	rate	
between	 2002	 and	 2014	 in	 Argentina	 grew	 substantially	 as	 did	 the	 rate	 of	 convictions.	
Meanwhile	the	percentage	of	suspended	sentences	as	part	of	the	total	convictions	and	the	
percentage	 of	 custodial	 sanctions	 both	 fell.	 Especially	 in	 relation	 to	 incarceration,	 these	
levels	of	change	are	not	as	stark	as	those	of	 the	preceding	decades.	However,	 the	trends	
persist.	 Therefore,	 the	 question	 of	 how	 to	 transcend	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 punitive	 turn	
remains	 a	 pending	 and	 urgent	 political	 subject.	 The	 article	 argues	 the	 importance	 of	
analysing	why	a	punitive	turn	is	interrupted	and	presents	an	explanation	of	it.	
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Introduction	
In	Argentina	between	1983	and	2003,	in	the	first	20	years	of	the	transition	to	democracy,	national	
governments	were	 constructed	out	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	 political	 programs	and	alliances.	 The	
government	 of	 the	 Radical	 Civic	 Union	 led	 by	 President	 Alfonsin	 (1983‐1989),	 which	 built	 a	
political	 program	 based	 on	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘social	 liberalism’,	 began	 the	 transition	 process.	 The	
economic	crisis	of	July	1989	led	to	an	early	handover	of	command	to	the	new	President,	Carlos	
Menem,	who	was	elected	by	the	opposition	Justicialist	Party,	the	institutional	form	of	the	Peronist	
movement.	 The	 national	 government	 of	 President	 Menem	 developed	 a	 series	 of	 extreme	
neoliberal	reforms	that	produced	strong	and	rapid	changes.	In	1995	President	Menem	was	re‐
elected	and	he	subsequently	governed	until	December	1999.	In	his	second	term,	the	deepening	
and	defended	neoliberal	reforms	became	evident,	showing	their	most	crude	results	in	terms	of	
the	growth	of	social	vulnerability	and	exclusion.	The	Menem	government	was	replaced	by	that	of	
President	De	la	Rua,	which	was	a	partnership	between	the	Radical	Civic	Union	and	the	Front	for	
a	Country	in	Solidarity	(FREPASO),	a	new	political	party	formed	out	of	the	Justicialist	Party	after	
its	neoliberal	turn,	and	which	was	presented	as	a	center‐left	alternative	to	‘Menemism’.	However,	
this	national	government	was	marked	by	strong	continuities	with	‘the	Menemist	decade’	and	fell	
abruptly	in	December	2001	during	the	most	challenging	economic,	social	and	political	crisis	since	
the	beginning	of	the	transition	to	democracy.	
	
After	the	interim	government	of	President	Eduardo	Duhalde,	general	elections	were	held	in	April	
2003.	Several	political	forces	that	competed	in	these	elections	were	born	out	of	the	Justicialist	
Party	and	the	Radical	Civic	Union,	traditionally	the	two	major	political	parties	as	a	result	of	the	so	
called	‘representation	crisis’	which	was	related	to	the	collapse	of	2001.	The	first	place	went	to	
former	President	Menem	with	24	per	cent	of	the	votes,	while	second	place,	with	22	per	cent	of	
the	votes,	was	obtained	by	Néstor	Kirchner,	governor	of	 the	Province	of	Santa	Cruz,	who	was	
supported	by	President	Duhalde.	A	second	round	of	elections	was	needed	for	the	first	time	since	
the	Constitutional	Reform	of	1994.	The	electoral	contest	between	Menem	and	Kirchner	clearly	
implied	a	debate	about	the	1990s	decade	within	Peronism.	While	Menem	presented	himself	as	a	
continuity	of	that	period,	Kirchner	presented	himself	as	breaking	with	it.	Because	a	strong	swing	
was	 expected	 in	 the	 electorate	 against	 Menem,	 he	 resigned	 from	 participation,	 resulting	 in	
Kirchner's	inauguration	as	the	President	in	May	2003.	
	
From	that	moment	onward	the	construction	of	a	new	governmental	alliance	started	to	slowly	
undergo	significant	changes:	‘Kirchnerism’.	This	alliance	went	on	to	build	a	political	program	that	
involved	 a	 new	 hybridization	 of	 the	 Peronist	 tradition	 with	 ‘postneoliberal’	 rhetoric	 and	
proposals	that	positioned	it	as	an	antagonist	to	the	1990s,	the	Menemist	decade.	After	a	fragile	
start,	this	political	alliance	and	program	consolidated	during	the	2005	legislative	elections,	and	
deepened	 even	 further	 after	 the	 election	 of	 Cristina	 Fernández	 de	 Kirchner	 –	 wife	 of	 Néstor	
Kirchner	–	as	President	in	2007.	She	was	re‐elected	after	the	death	of	her	husband	in	2011	but	
her	mandate	ended	in	2015,	in	what	constituted	the	closure	of	this	governmental	experience.	
	
This	paper	seeks	to	explore	the	relationship	during	these	years	between	Kirchnerism	as	a	political	
alliance	and	program	which	presented	itself	as	postneoliberal,	and	penal	policy	at	a	national	level.	
Evaluating	this	appeal	towards	a	postneoliberal	character	becomes	complex.	Beyond	the	rhetoric	
of	 the	actors	 that	made	and	sustained	this	alliance,	 several	 changes	during	 this	period	can	be	
identified	in	the	different	sectors	of	public	policy	that	implied	antagonistic	turns	in	relation	to	the	
patterns	that	were	constructed	during	the	Menemist	decade.	For	example,	there	was	the	change	
in	terms	of	international	politics,	from	the	automatic	alignment	with	the	US	government	to	the	
strategic	 alliance	 with	 Brazil	 and	 Venezuela,	 expressed	 symbolically	 in	 the	 Ibero‐American	
Summit	of	Mar	del	Plata	in	2005	and	the	joint	rejection	of	the	Free	Trade	Areas	of	the	Americas	
(Área	de	Libre	Comercio	de	las	Américas	or	ALCA)	proposal.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	also	possible	to	
identify	continuities	with	the	recent	past	in	various	fields	and	sectors.	Importantly,	however,	this	
governmental	alliance,	from	the	outset,	has	been	considered	not	only	by	its	adherents	but	also	by	
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some	 influential	 opponents	 –	 especially	 those	 who	 are	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 neoliberal	
principles	–	as	a	break	with	the	recent	past	in	which	neoliberalism	as	a	governmental	rationality	
has	played	a	decisive	 role.	The	use	of	 the	 ‘postneoliberal’	 expression	attempts	 to	 capture	 this	
dimension,	although	not	as	a	means	of	defining	the	game	of	continuities	and	discontinuities	that	
has	produced	this	political	process.	In	any	case,	the	exploration	of	the	penal	field	itself	that	this	
work	proposes	can	contribute	to	the	realization	of	this	task.	
	
It	is	possible	to	construct	a	periodization	regarding	the	relationship	between	Kirchnerism	as	a	
political	alliance	and	program	and	the	penal	field	by	differentiating	three	fundamental	moments.	
The	 distinguishing	 criterion	 of	 these	 three	moments	 is	 a	 predominant	 attitude	 towards	what	
appears	as	the	immediate	past	with	regard	to	penal	policy,	dominated	by	a	strong	punitive	turn	
that,	among	other	results,	produced	a	98	per	cent	growth	of	the	rate	of	incarceration	between	
1992	and	2002.2	
	
Following	the	current	
The	campaign	for	the	presidential	election	of	2003	was	strongly	marked	by	the	topic	of	crime,	as	
was	its	immediate	predecessor	in	1999.	The	candidate	Menem	deployed	an	‘iron	hand’	rhetoric,	
by	 repeating	 his	 own	 past	 proposals	 –	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 death	 penalty,	 decreasing	 the	
minimum	 age	 of	 criminal	 responsibility,	 and	 so	 on	 –	 to	 which	 he	 added	 reversing	 the	 legal	
prohibition	of	the	Armed	Forces	to	participate	in	the	‘fight	against	crime’,	which	prohibition	had	
been	 one	 of	 the	 important	 progresses	made	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	
(Kessler	2010:	78).	By	contrast,	as	a	perverse	outcome	of	the	neoliberal	reforms	carried	out	in	
the	1990s,	Kirchner	constructed	an	antithetical	discourse	that	strongly	linked	people’s	feelings	of	
insecurity	 due	 to	 crime	 to	 the	 social	 question	 –	 increased	 poverty,	 unemployment	 and	 social	
inequality	 –	 and	 advocated	 for	 emphasizing	 ‘social	 inclusion’	 and	 ‘crime	 prevention’.	 This	
message	was	combined	with	an	appeal	for	the	need	to	prosecute	the	crimes	of	the	powerful,	such	
as	corruption	or	tax	evasion.	After	the	inauguration	of	President	Kirchner	an	official	rhetoric	from	
the	 national	 government	 developed	 that	 sought	 to	 move	 away	 from	 the	 dynamics	 of	 penal	
populism	that	had	been	installed	in	Argentina	in	the	mid‐1990s,	echoing	his	discourses	during	
the	election	campaign	(Sozzo	2016a).	
	
This	rhetorical	shift	was	accompanied	by	some	significant	decisions	and	actions.	In	the	policing	
field,	the	avoidance	of	the	use	of	force	was	a	noteworthy	change	in	the	intervention	strategies	of	
the	federal	security	forces	with	regard	to	protests	and	public	demonstrations	(CELS	2003,	2008).	
In	addition,	some	major	purges	of	these	police	forces	reclaimed	the	fight	against	police	corruption	
and	the	political	control	of	police	institutions	and	activities.	Some	other	ambitious	measures	and	
reform	plans	were	also	announced	that,	however,	never	developed	further	(Sain	2012a,	2012b).	
	
In	the	penal	field,	the	impetus	given	by	the	national	government	to	the	prosecution,	judgment	and	
punishment	of	State	crimes	during	the	last	military	dictatorship	importantly	generated	various	
measures.	This	included	the	legislative	annulment	of	the	so‐called	Due	Obedience	Law	and	the	
Final	Point	Law	in	August	2003,	which,	although	supported	by	several	political	parties,	had	the	
fundamental	backing	of	the	governing	party	(CELS	2003).	From	this	moment	onward	a	strong	
alliance	 was	 developed	 between	 most	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 organizations	 in	 Argentina	 and	
Kirchnerism,	which	produced	multiple	subsequent	effects.	This	resulted	in	a	strong	presence	of	
the	human	rights	theme	in	both	the	official	agenda	and	rhetoric,	especially	in	relation	to	the	State	
crimes	 committed	 during	 the	 last	 military	 dictatorship.	 As	 a	 result,	 an	 important	 process	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 trial	 and	 punishment	 of	 these	 crimes	 by	 the	 federal	 criminal	 justice	 system	
gradually	emerged	(CELS	2013;	Feierstein	2014;	Zysman	Quiros	2015).	This	decision,	which	was	
sustained	 over	 time,	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 attitude	 towards	 Kirchnerism	 as	 a	
political	ally	in	relation	to	penality.	As	I	have	argued	with	respect	to	penal	policy	at	the	beginning	
of	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	 (Sozzo	 2011b,	 2013),	 the	 cultivation	 and	maintenance	 of	 the	
memory	of	State	crimes	as	a	paroxysmal	example	of	the	abuse	of	power	during	the	last	military	
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dictatorship	made	it	relatively	difficult	for	the	governmental	actors	to	promote	a	rhetoric	in	favor	
of	increased	punitiveness	for	street	crime	in	the	public	and	political	debate.	The	risk	of	falling	in	
its	excess	is	an	image	that	was	constantly	evoked	and	that	had	the	potential	to	generate,	at	least	
for	its	members	and	supporters,	an	insurmountable	contradiction.	Another	important	decision	of	
the	national	government	was	the	impetus	provided	for	the	rejuvenation	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	
Justice	of	the	nation,	changing	its	former	composition	that	had	repeatedly	been	denounced	for	its	
collusion	 with	 the	 Menemist	 political	 alliance	 during	 the	 1990s.	 For	 the	 first	 vacant	 post,	
President	Kirchner	proposed	the	appointment	of	the	prestigious	criminal	law	professor	Eugenio	
R	Zaffaroni,	who	had	high	symbolic	value	due	to	his	liberal	and	moderate	penal	orientation	(CELS	
2003).	
	
Then,	in	March	2004	a	phenomenon	emerged	that	blocked	these	first	discourses	and	actions.	Axel	
Blumberg	–	an	upper‐middle	class	young	student	from	Greater	Buenos	Aires	–	was	kidnapped	
and	murdered.	This	generated	a	strong	social	mobilization,	due	to	the	activism	of	his	father,	which	
called	for	the	need	to	change	penal	and	policing	policies.	A	petition,	which	gathered	more	than	
five	 million	 signatures,3	 requested	 the	 executive	 and	 legislative	 authorities	 of	 the	 national	
government	and	the	government	of	the	Province	of	Buenos	Aires	implement	reforms	that	focused	
on	 the	 increase	of	penal	 severity.	 This	 request	was	 accompanied	by	 the	 constant	presence	of	
Blumberg’s	father	in	the	mass	media	and	by	a	number	of	massive	demonstrations	that	pressured	
political	 bodies.	 The	 first,	which	was	 held	 in	 front	 of	 the	National	 Congress	 on	 1	 April	 2004,	
brought	together	around	150,000	people.	
	
The	 self‐proclaimed	 ‘Axel	Crusade’	 signified	 the	emergence	of	 ‘bottoms‐up	penal	populism’	 in	
Argentina.	That	is	to	say,	a	form	of	populistic	penal	policy‐making,	in	the	name	of	‘what	the	people	
think	and	want’,	emerged	which	leant	toward	increasing	punitiveness	but	was,	to	some	extent,	
structured	and	accompanied	by	the	mobilization	of	certain	sectors	of	the	public	that	were	built	
around	 the	 figure	of	 the	 victim	as	 a	 subject,	with	moral	authority	born	out	of	 suffering.4	This	
collective	 mobilization	 appealed	 strongly	 to	 the	 deployment	 of	 emotions	 and	 feelings	 of	 a	
negative	nature	–	hate,	anger,	fear	–	among	citizens	with	regard	to	the	offense	and	the	offender	
but	also	creates	a	‘we’,	the	‘honest’	citizens	that	could	always	become	the	victims	of	crime.	Certain	
elements	with	an	alleged	‘common	sense’	approach	to	the	crime	problem	–	mainly	amongst	the	
middle‐class	 –	 are	 redeemed	 here	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 expert	 knowledge.	 This	 development	
shakes	and	challenges	‘the	establishment’	in	the	field	of	crime	control	policies.	In	the	case	of	the	
Axel	Crusade,	the	establishment	consisted	of	law	professors	and	judicial	officials	who,	since	the	
late	1990s,	had	 frequently	been	stigmatized	with	 the	adjective	of	 ‘garantista’,	 and	 in	 so	doing	
reviled	as	the	‘defenders	of	the	criminals’.	But	professional	politicians,	actors	who	had	only	lent	
an	ear	to	the	expert	knowledge,	had	also	moved	away	from	‘what	the	people	think	and	want’.	On	
many	 occasions,	 Blumberg	 himself	 insisted	 on	 his	 ‘apolitical’	 nature,	 overcoming	 political	
divisions	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 an	 ‘all’	 that	 identified	with	 ‘the	people’.	 Somehow,	 these	 collective	
mobilizations	connected	with	 the	political	activation	of	various	social	groups	during	 the	2001	
crisis	and	the	subsequent	crisis	of	representation	which	involved	the	traditional	political	parties	
(Grimson	and	Kessler	2005:	173‐174;	Schillagi	2009:	30;	Svampa	2005:	263‐266,	271‐272).	With	
the	use	of	various	methods	–	petitions,	demonstrations,	and	so	on	–	these	mobilized	sectors	of	the	
public,	in	the	name	of	the	people	who	had	a	hostile	attitude	towards	politicians	and	experts,	were	
amplified	by	the	media,	following	the	trends	observed	from	the	second	half	of	the	1990s	(Sozzo	
2016b:	307‐311).	The	media	made	this	new	‘wave	of	insecurity’	–	linked	specifically	to	extortive	
kidnapping	followed	by	death,	and	the	public	reaction	to	it,	which	was	mainly	manifested	by	the	
Axel	Crusade	–	a	prime	news	topic	 in	2004,	and	 in	so	doing	strongly	colonized	various	media	
spaces	(Calzado	and	Van	den	Dooren	2009:	98‐101).	
	
The	 Axel	 Crusade	 generated	 strong	 responses,	 both	 from	 the	 Executive	 Power	 and	 from	 the	
Legislative	Power	at	national	and	at	provincial	levels,	especially	in	the	Province	of	Buenos	Aires,	
the	 epicenter	 of	 the	 Blumberg	 case.	 Consensus	 was	 constructed	 that	 cut	 across	 the	 political	
parties	in	relation	to	the	need	to	‘urgently’	react	to	what	was	visualized	as	a	demand	from	‘the	
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citizenry’	 in	 favor	 of	 police	 and	 penal	 hardening,	without	 at	 any	moment	 problematizing	 the	
actual	composition	of	these	collective	mobilizations.	The	preferred	instrument	for	this	reaction,	
as	during	the	 first	wave	of	penal	populism	produced	 ‘from	above’	since	the	 late	1990s	(Sozzo	
2016b:	307‐311),	was	the	creation	of	the	penal	law.	As	posed	by	Calzado	and	Van	den	Dooren	
(2009)	on	a	national	level,	in	many	cases	this	meant	revitalizing	legal	change	initiatives	that	had	
already	been	presented	in	the	National	Congress	and	in	a	few	cases	involved	the	proposal	of	new	
legal	projects.	In	any	case,	the	key	to	making	headway	and	getting	legislative	approval	was	the	
connection	of	 these	 initiatives	 to	 the	demands	of	 the	Axel	Crusade.	Blumberg	himself	 and	his	
advisers	were	present	during	the	debates	of	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	and	Senators	and	in	some	
cases	they	were	even	allowed	to	participate	in	the	debates	of	the	Commissions	of	both	Chambers	
(Calzado	and	Van	den	Dooren	2009).	
	
In	 this	 context,	 several	 legal	 changes	 developed	 that	 were	 clearly	 focused	 on	 increasing	
punitiveness	and,	in	so	doing,	reproduced	a	trend	that	has	been	observed	in	other	contexts	(Pratt	
2007:	 18‐19).	 These	 became	 known	 not	 only	 in	 political	 and	 media	 discourses	 but	 also	 in	
academia	as	the	‘Blumberg	reforms’.	The	severity	of	punishment	was	increased	for	several	types	
of	offenses:	the	access	to	parole	and	temporary	releases	for	certain	convicts	was	blocked;	and	the	
use	of	prison	on	remand	as	a	precautionary	measure	was	increased	(Sozzo	2016a).	These	legal	
changes	 and	 the	 strong	 presence	 of	 the	 claims	 for	 increasing	 punitiveness	 in	 the	 public	 and	
political	debate	helped	prolong	a	 ‘climate’	(Sparks	2003a:	32)	among	criminal	 justice	officials,	
especially	judges	and	prosecutors,	around	the	need	to	increase	the	severity	of	their	daily	decision‐
making	with	regard	to	the	imposition	of	prison	on	remand	and	penality.	This	climate,	generated	
during	the	first	wave	of	‘penal	populism	from	above’,	was	particularly	strong	in	the	context	of	the	
Province	of	Buenos	Aires	and	included	critical	and	direct	pressure	from	political	actors	on	the	
judicial	actors	around	specific	cases	and	decisions	(Bombini	2008:	40;	CELS	2005:	145‐147;	Sozzo	
2016b:	307‐311).	
	
The	political	alliance	of	President	Kirchner,	both	at	a	national	level	and	in	the	Province	of	Buenos	
Aires,	had	an	ambiguous	attitude	towards	the	Axel	Crusade	(CELS	2007;	Schillagi	2009).	Several	
key	 players,	 including	 the	 President	 himself,	 met	 with	 Blumberg	 and	 maintained	 a	 cautious	
attitude	towards	his	demands	and	proposals.	It	is	true	that,	on	the	one	hand,	some	Kirchnerist	
actors	publicly	spoke	out	against	his	initiatives,	especially	in	the	second	half	of	2004	when	they	
began	 to	 observe	 glimpses	 of	 what	 was	 identified	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘politicization’	 of	 the	 social	
movements	that	had	been	generated.	However,	the	national	Executive	Power	launched	a	General	
Plan	of	Security	and	Justice	at	the	end	of	April	2004,	which	was	a	clear	response	to	the	emergence	
of	the	Axel	Crusade	and	included	some	measures	that	were	proposed	in	the	petition,	such	as	the	
decrease	of	 the	minimum	age	of	 criminal	 responsibility.	On	 the	other	hand,	beyond	what	was	
publicly	said,	most	of	the	parliamentary	representatives	of	this	political	alliance	voted	in	favor	of	
the	various	national	and	provincial	laws	(Sozzo	2016a).	
	
As	has	been	pointed	out	elsewhere,	the	preceding	wave,	from	the	late	1990s,	of	‘penal	populism	
from	above’	 had	broken	with	 a	mode	of	 penal	policy‐making	 that	was	highly	 elitist,	 centered	
around	the	voice	of	experts	in	the	field	of	criminal	law,	that	had	a	particular	focus	on	the	‘ought	
to	 be’	 and	 was	 protected	 from	 interventions	 from	 the	 ‘public’.	 This	 first	 wave,	 generated	 by	
politics	and	the	media,	for	the	first	time	since	the	transition	to	democracy	put	‘what	the	people	
think	and	want’	as	a	central	axis	in	the	penal	field.	This	reference,	which	was	repeated	endlessly	
in	the	media,	produced	a	strong	message	that	allowed	certain	social	sectors,	confronting	specific	
manifestations	 of	 the	 crime	 problem	 and	 from	 the	 experience	 of	 being	 victims,	 to	 establish	
themselves	as	representatives	of	that	entity,	‘the	people’,	and	from	there	pose	a	series	of	demands	
in	the	penal	field.	In	other	words,	the	wave	of	‘penal	populism	from	below’	was	cemented	by	the	
previous	wave	of	‘penal	populism	from	above’,	as	the	first	prepared	the	way	for	the	second,	thus	
making	it	possible	(Sozzo	2016a:	203,	2016b:	313).	
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The	economic,	social	and	political	collapse	of	2001,	which	was	a	paroxysmal	manifestation	of	the	
crisis	of	the	traditional	political	parties	in	Argentina	–	the	main	motto	of	the	citizens	in	the	streets	
during	protests	at	this	time	was	‘throw	them	all	out	so	that	not	even	one	stays’	–	opened	the	way	
for	the	development	of	new	forms	of	social	and	political	mobilization	that	had	gradually	been	
unfolding	 during	 the	 1990s.	 Although	 there	 had	 previously	 been	 some	 forms	 of	 social	
mobilization	in	relation	to	the	crime	problem	that	acquired	a	certain	level	of	organization	and	
persistence	over	time,	they	were	related	to	the	‘crimes	of	the	powerful’,	such	as	the	movement	
for	the	trial	and	punishment	of	State	crimes	during	the	last	military	dictatorship.	With	respect	to	
‘street	crime’,	the	mobilizations	had	been	minor	and	short‐lived.	The	scenario	of	the	2001	crisis	
enabled	a	phenomenon	such	as	the	Axel	Crusade	–	one	that	was	massive	and	sustained	over	time	
–	to	emerge,	amalgamating	traces	of	these	various	precedents	and	with	some	overlap	in	regard	
to	 the	 criticism	and	 distrust	 toward	political	 and	 institutional	 authorities	 (Sozzo	2016a:	 203‐
204).	
	
The	 ‘crisis	 of	 insecurity’	 in	 the	 public	 and	 political	 sphere	 since	 the	 late	 1990s	 also	 played	 a	
significant	 role	 in	 this	 wave	 of	 ‘penal	 populism	 from	 below’.	 This	 was	 strongly	 tied	 to	 the	
devastating	economic,	social	and	cultural	effects	of	the	neoliberal	reforms	during	the	Menemist	
decade	because	they	disseminated	feelings	of	social	vulnerability	and	exclusion	and	a	widespread	
sense	of	precariousness,	transformation	and	uncertainty,	even	among	the	socially	included.	This	
found	expression	and	concentration	in	‘street	crime’.	Since	the	second	half	of	the	1990s,	street	
crimes	seemed	to	be	experiencing	some	growth,	especially	in	the	two	jurisdictions	of	the	City	and	
the	Province	of	Buenos	Aires,	both	epicenters	of	the	emergence	of	the	waves	of	penal	populism,	
although	the	available	evidence	does	not	entirely	support	this	(Sozzo	2005,	2012,	2016a,	2016b).	
However,	 similar	 to	 Katherine	 Beckett	 (1997),	 I	 believe	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 avoid	 the	 naive	
interpretation	 that	 automatically	 ties	 the	 increase	 in	 street	 crime	 to	 the	 increased	 concern	of	
citizens	 and	 the	 increased	punitive	demand,	what	Beckett	defined	 as	 ‘the	democracy	 at	work	
thesis’.	This	interpretation	is	welcomed	by	political	actors	who	consequently	take	decisions	and	
actions.	The	elites,	with	their	privileged	access	to	the	media	and	political	debate	–	especially	when	
they	are	state	officials	–	have	the	ability	to	define	social	problems	by	moulding,	at	least	in	part,	
the	ways	in	which	segments	of	the	public	get	to	see	these	issues.	Issues	are	never	created	out	of	
nothing	but,	instead,	by	selecting	meanings	that	resonate	with	their	experiences	of	everyday	life,	
not	univocally	but	 rather	 through	 conflicts	 and	 struggles	 (Beckett	 and	 Sasson	2001;	 see	 also,	
Barker	2009;	Lacey	2008;	Savelsberg	1994,	1999;	Sparks	2003a;	Zimring	and	Johnson	2006).	In	
fact,	as	I	illustrated	earlier,	a	significant	increase	of	street	crime	in	Argentina	during	the	first	stage	
of	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	 –	 or	 at	 least	 as	 registered	 by	 the	 official	 statistics	 –	 was	 not	
accompanied	 by	 a	 corresponding	 growth	 of	 punitiveness	 (Sozzo	 2011b;	 2013).	 However,	 an	
increase	 in	 street	 crime,	 especially	 when	 rates	 grow	 quickly	 and	 on	 an	 elevated	 scale,	 may	
contribute	 to	 a	wave	 of	 penal	 populism,	 given	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 series	 of	 other	 political	 and	
cultural	factors.	Street	crime	by	itself	is	not	the	catalyst	for	penal	populism	which,	in	turn	is	not	
dependent	on	elevated	street	crime	statistics	(Beckett	1997;	Nelken	2010a;	Pratt	2007;	Roberts	
et	al.	2003;	Zimring	and	Johnson	2006).	
	
Well,	how	can	we	 then	explain	 the	attitude	of	 the	political	alliance	around	President	Kirchner	
confronting	the	Axel	Crusade,	which	was	marked	by	a	certain	rhetorical	ambiguity	while	at	the	
same	time	supporting	the	enactment	of	national	and	provincial	legislative	reforms	that	coincided	
with	movement	claims	and	proposals?	The	answer	is	based	on	what	constituted	a	fundamental	
feature	of	Kirchnerism	during	its	initial	development	phase:	its	political	weakness.	This	stemmed	
from	 obtaining	 only	 22	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 votes	 in	 the	 2003	 elections	 and	 from	 its	 complex	
relationship	with	the	sector	of	the	Justiscialist	Party	led	by	former	President	Duhalde.	The	social	
mobilizations	of	the	Axel	Crusade,	amplified	by	the	media,	appeared	impossible	to	ignore	for	the	
governmental	alliance	which	was	simultaneously	working	on	the	development	of	its	own	political	
identity	–	meaning	 the	new	postneoliberal	 face	of	 the	Peronist	 tradition	–	as	 it	 sought	 to	gain	
political	and	electoral	consensus	centered	on	an	agenda	of	 reform	measures;	 for	example,	 the	
payment	 and	 release	 of	 external	 debt,	 human	 rights	 policy,	 and	 so	 on.	 A	 large	 number	 of	
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Kirchnerists	acted	out	of	‘convenience’	marked	by	weakness	and	urgency,	generating	a	pragmatic	
response	 to	 perceived	 sustained	 and	 univocal	 social	 pressure.	 However,	 there	 were	 also	
Kirchnerist	actors	who	acted	out	 ‘of	conscience’,	as	they	had	actively	supported	the	preceding	
first	wave	of	 ‘penal	populism	 from	above’	 since	 the	mid‐1990s	 (Sozzo	2016b:	 307‐311).	This	
evidences	the	heterogeneous	nature	of	this	governmental	alliance.		
	
It	may	be	useful	to	think	about	this	particular	reaction	–	and,	in	general,	about	the	strategies	of	
the	political	actors	during	these	waves	of	‘penal	populism	from	below’	in	times	of	crisis	–	in	terms	
of	an	embryonic	 idea	posed	by	Durkheim	and	picked	up	by	Garland	 (1996).	The	weakness	of	
democratic	political	authorities	in	times	of	uncertainty	and	social	turbulence,	which	are	linked	to	
perceptions	of	mistrust	and	illegitimacy	of	those	authorities	by	the	citizens,	tends	to	generate	an	
authority’s	 resort	 to	 repressive	 instruments	 as	 a	 way	 to	 at	 least	 provide	 the	 appearance	 of	
maintaining	 social	 order	 and,	 in	 this	 framework,	 its	 own	 privileged	 position	 as	 a	 political	
authority	(also	see	Pratt	2007;	Sparks	2003a;	2003b;	Zimring	and	Johnson	2006).	
	
We	can	now	turn	our	attention	to	what	happened	to	punitiveness	in	Argentina	during	these	years	
(see	Sozzo	2011b,	2013	for	more	about	this	complex	notion).	There	are	few	indicators	available	
in	this	respect.	On	the	one	hand,	we	have	official	data	that	allow	us	to	approach	the	evolution	of	
imprisonment	rates.	It	has	repeatedly	been	pointed	out	that	the	number	of	incarcerated	persons	
or	the	incarceration	rate	per	100,000	inhabitants	is	not	the	only	indicator	to	measure	levels	of	
punitiveness	 (Brodeur	 2007;	 Kommer	 2004;	 Nelken	 2005,	 2010a,	 2010b;	 Pease	 1994;	 Tonry	
2007).	But	 it	must	be	recognized	that	 it	allows	us	to	approach	the	crucial	phenomenon	of	the	
degree	of	extension	of	the	penal	system	(Beckett	and	Sasson	2001;	Cavadino	and	Dignam	2006;	
Lacey	 2008).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 we	 have	 official	 data	 about	 the	 growth	 in	 the	 number	 of	
convictions.	These	statistics	allow	us	to	approach	the	numbers	dimension	of	punitiveness.	But	the	
characteristics	of	these	convictions	allow	us	to	approach	the	degree	of	penal	intensity,	its	other	
dimension.	
	
With	 regard	 to	 imprisonment,	 the	 rate	 of	 123	 prisoners	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants	 in	 2002	
increased	 to	 144	 prisoners	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants	 in	 2005.	 Excluded	 from	 this	 are	 persons	
deprived	 of	 their	 liberty	 in	 police	 headquarters	 and	 precincts	 that	were	 to	 be	 prosecuted	 or	
convicted,	which	number	was	not	officially	reported.	This	implies	an	increase	of	17	per	cent	in	
three	years.	With	regard	to	convictions,	the	number	increased	from	25,538	in	2002	to	32,965	in	
2005,	 an	 overall	 increase	 of	 29	 per	 cent.	 In	 2002	 42	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 convictions	 were	 of	 a	
conditional	compliance	nature	and	58	per	cent	were	of	an	effective	compliance	nature.	In	2005	
they	became,	respectively,	35	per	cent	and	65	per	cent.	In	2002	81	per	cent	of	the	sanctions	were	
custodial,	while	the	remaining	19	per	cent	were	noncustodial;	in	2005	the	percentage	of	the	first	
increased	to	85	per	cent,	reducing	the	latter	to	15	per	cent.	In	2002,	custodial	sanctions	of	less	
than	three	years	were	71.8	per	cent	of	the	total;	in	2005	this	proportion	fell	to	66	per	cent.	As	can	
be	observed,	punitiveness	experienced	a	significant	growth	according	to	all	these	indicators	as	a	
result	of	this	wave	of	‘penal	populism	from	below’,	which	came	to	ratify	and	deepen	the	trend	that	
was	born	out	of	the	first	wave	of	‘penal	populism	from	above’	from	the	mid‐1990s	(Sozzo	2016a:	
210‐213,	2016b:	311).5		
	
Against	the	current?	
The	year	2005	became	very	 important	 in	 the	consolidation	of	Kirchnerism	as	a	governmental	
alliance	and	program.	This	was	produced	through	the	campaign	for	the	legislative	elections	in	
which	the	alliance	clearly	defeated	the	opposing	sectors,	inside	and	outside	of	Peronism.	It	was	
also	a	year	in	which	the	national	government	was	able	to	present	various	achievements	related	
to	its	postneoliberal	identity:	the	economic	recovery	as	evidenced	by	the	growth	of	the	GDP	and	
declining	 poverty	 and	 unemployment	 levels	 through	 a	 heterodox	 economic	 policy	 strategy	
against	the	‘Washington	consensus’;	the	renationalization	of	public	services	that	were	privatized	
during	 the	 Menemist	 decade;	 the	 update	 of	 wages	 and	 public	 pensions;	 the	 repeal	 of	 some	
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neoliberal	labor	reforms	and	the	restoration	of	collective	labor	agreements;	the	alignment	with	
the	 progressive	 governments	 of	 the	 region	 such	 as	 Brazil	 and	 Venezuela;	 the	 early	 debt	
repayment	to	the	IMF;	and	so	on	(Novaro	2010:	298;	Svampa	2011:	23‐27,	2013:	14).	
	
Within	 this	 context	 the	 fourth	March	 of	 the	 Axel	 Crusade	 occurred	 in	 April.	 The	 new	 public	
demonstration	 organized	by	Blumberg	was	 received	with	 a	 certain	 detachment	 by	 the	 ruling	
political	alliance.	Moreover,	it	had	no	impact	in	terms	of	specific	measures	that	were	designed	to	
generate	criminal	hardening	(Schilaggi	2009;	Sozzo	2016a).	
	
In	parallel	with	this,	an	initiative	was	launched	by	the	national	government	that	clearly	went	in	
the	opposite	direction	to	the	recent	waves	of	penal	populism.	The	Ministry	of	Justice	and	Human	
Rights	created	a	committee	of	experts	to	draft	a	new	Criminal	Code.	This	decision	meant	returning	
to	a	method	of	penal	policy‐making	 that	had	prevailed	 in	 the	early	 stages	of	 the	 transition	 to	
democracy;	that	is,	valuing	the	experts’	voices	in	the	field	of	criminal	law	and	creating	a	space	for	
debate	and	decision	making,	without	any	direct	public	involvement	(Sozzo	2011a,	2011b,	2013).	
The	committee	presented	a	preliminary	draft	in	May	2006,	which	included	many	innovations	that	
clearly	 moved	 towards	 moderating	 levels	 of	 penal	 severity.	 It	 was	 publicly	 identified	 as	 a	
‘Garantista’	initiative.	However,	in	July	of	the	same	year,	the	provisional	draft	was	‘frozen’	by	the	
new	Minister	of	Justice	and	Human	Rights	who	claimed	that	it	was	not	a	priority	for	the	national	
government	(Sozzo	2016a:	216‐217).	
	
At	this	time,	in	August	2006,	Blumberg	organised	his	last	march,	which	had	a	much	lower	turn‐
out	than	the	previous	ones	and	which	posed	as	one	of	its	fundamental	claims	that	the	draft	be	
disregarded.	In	general,	this	last	march	triggered	a	critical	response	from	the	Kirchnerist	alliance,	
which	identified	it	as	the	start	of	the	politicization	of	the	mobilization	of	‘the	victims	of	insecurity,’	
adopting	a	‘right‐wing’	position	and	entering	into	the	political	and	electoral	arena.	This	response	
became	harsher	as	time	passed	(CELS	2007:	232‐233,	239;	Schillagi	2009:	11‐12;	Sozzo	2016a:	
217‐218).	
	
Another	 important	 element	was	also	 incorporated	at	 the	start	of	2005	within	 the	Province	of	
Buenos	Aires.	The	Center	for	Legal	and	Social	Studies,	one	of	the	most	important	human	rights	
organizations	in	Argentina,	had	in	2001	presented	a	collective	action	of	corrective	habeas	corpus	
–	which	was	 joined	by	various	non‐governmental	organizations	–	 for	 the	overcrowding	of	 the	
police	headquarters	and	precincts	to	be	declared	illegal	 in	the	Province	of	Buenos	Aires.	After	
various	procedures	and	judicial	remedies,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Justice	of	the	nation	ruled	in	its	
favor	in	May	–	known	as	the	Verbitsky	case	–	ordering	all	courts	in	the	Province	of	Buenos	Aires	
to	 cease	 operating	 in	 ways	 that	 worsened	 the	 detention	 conditions	 in	 their	 territory.	
Furthermore,	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 Province	 of	 Buenos	 Aires	 was	 ordered	 to	 generate	 a	
roundtable	discussion	with	the	complainants	in	order	to	improve	the	detention	conditions	and	to	
consider	 the	 rules	 that	 determined	 the	Minimum	Standard	 for	 the	Treatment	 of	 Prisoners	 as	
developed	by	the	United	Nations	(Ales,	Borda	and	Alderete	Lobo	2005;	CELS	2005,	2007).	That	
said,	the	most	important	outcome	of	the	case	was	the	triggering	of	a	criminal	procedure	reform	
that	 reversed	 some	 previous	 changes	 made	 to	 the	 Criminal	 Procedure	 Code	 in	 relation	 to	
prisoners	on	remand.	This	ruled	out	the	existence	of	offences	in	which	it	was	mandatory	to	use	
this	 precautionary	 measure,	 promoting	 the	 use	 of	 alternative	 measures	 and	 installing	
mechanisms	for	the	periodic	review	of	them	(CELS	2007).	
	
The	relationship	between	Kirchnerism	and	penal	policy	encountered	another	important	moment	
during	the	campaign	for	the	general	elections	in	2007	at	the	end	of	President	Kirchner’s	term.	
The	alliance	presented	President	Cristina	Fernández	de	Kirchner	as	its	candidate	and	won	with	
45	per	cent	of	the	votes,	compared	to	the	23	per	cent	of	the	coalition	in	second	place.	Kirchnerism	
also	won	 the	 election	 for	 the	 Governor’s	 position	 in	 the	 Province	 of	 Buenos	 Aires	 and	 other	
provinces,	but	lost	in	some	important	districts	such	as	the	City	of	Buenos	Aires	and	the	Province	
of	Santa	Fe.	Cristina	Fernández	marginalized	the	issue	of	crime	during	her	campaign	and,	on	the	
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few	 occasions	 that	 she	 did	 refer	 to	 the	matter,	 adopted	 the	 general	 position	which	 had	 also	
characterized	 the	electoral	 rhetoric	of	her	husband	 in	2003	 (CELS	2008;	Colombo	2011).	 She	
focused	 on	 other	 topics	 that	were	 strongly	 linked	 to	what,	 at	 the	 time,	 already	 constituted	 a	
program	around	a	postneoliberal	 identity	of	the	Peronist	tradition	(Svampa	2011).	 In	general,	
this	electoral	campaign	involved	a	withdrawal	of	the	crime	problem	and,	in	particular,	a	reduction	
of	gestures	in	favor	of	increased	punitiveness	in	the	political	and	electoral	debate	that	had	had	
such	prominence	in	Argentina	since	the	mid‐1990s.		
	
In	the	last	three	years	of	the	government	of	President	Néstor	Kirchner,	no	penal	initiatives	were	
supported	by	his	political	alliance	that	were	deliberately	oriented	towards	the	growth	of	penal	
severity,	unlike	the	first	eighteen	months	of	his	mandate.6	The	Kirchnerist	alliance	helped	in	that	
regard	 by	 marginalizing	 the	 crime	 problem	 in	 the	 political	 and	 electoral	 debate,	 especially	
towards	the	end	of	this	period.	This	occurred	despite	social	movements	that	sought	to	promote	
punitive	measures	‘from	below’	similar	to	those	that	had	occurred	during	his	first	year	and	a	half	
in	the	national	government.	This	resistance	was	not	generated	by	directly	or	openly	confronting	
punitive	proposals	–	although	some	alliance	actors	did	so	at	certain	 times	–	but	 rather	with	a	
tactic	that	combined	silence	with	a	general	rhetoric	that	connected	the	criminal	question	to	the	
social	question.	But	fundamentally,	Kirchnerism	maintained	this	approach	by	promoting	other	
topics	that	were	strongly	tied	to	the	consolidation	of	its	political	program	as	postneoliberal.	This	
is	a	good	example	of	how	the	politicization	–	understood	in	terms	of	electoralization	–	of	crime	
and	punishment	is	not	an	irreversible	process	born	out	of	an	alleged	epochal	change	but	rather	a	
product	of,	 and	 is	 therefore	subject	 to,	 the	results	of	political	struggle	 (Sparks	2003b).	 In	 this	
sense,	the	politicization	of	crime	and	punishment	is	a	consequence	of	the	de‐politization	of	other	
issues,	which	opens	the	possibility	for	situations	to	arise	that	produce	a	reversal	of	such	a	trend	
(Zedner	2002).	
	
During	 this	 period	 Kirchnerism	 even	 created	 certain	 incipient	 actions	 that	 advanced	 in	 the	
opposite	 direction,	 towards	 the	 reversal	 of	 previous	waves	 of	 penal	 populism.	 Some	 of	 these	
actions	 did	 not	 develop	 from	 actors	 that	 could	 strictly	 be	 considered	 part	 of	 the	 Kirchnerist	
alliance,	as	with	the	human	rights	organizations	and	the	Supreme	Court	of	Justice	of	the	Nation	in	
the	Verbitsky	case.	However,	generally,	these	actors	had	been	supported	by	the	government	of	
President	Kirchner	since	the	beginning	of	his	mandate.	Moreover,	within	the	specific	context	of	
the	 implementation	of	 that	court	 ruling,	some	Kirchnerist	actors	 from	the	Province	of	Buenos	
Aires	 also	provided	 their	 support	 for	 some	actions,	 such	 as	 the	 criminal	procedure	 reform	of	
2006.	In	relation	to	the	draft	 for	a	new	penal	code,	the	initiative	was	caught	between	internal	
tensions	and	contradictions	within	this	political	alliance	around	a	far‐reaching	measure	towards	
penal	moderation.	In	any	case,	this	attitude	of	the	Kirchnerist	alliance	with	regard	to	penal	policy	
was	constructed	at	a	time	of	political	strength	–	just	after	the	2005	elections	–	when	it	drastically	
opposed	the	extreme	weakness	that	was	observed	during	the	gestation	period	of	the	first	wave	
of	‘criminal	populism	from	below’.		
	
One	may	also	think	that	these	barriers	with	regard	to	the	reproduction	and	amplification	of	the	
punitive	turn	were	supported	by	the	process	of	economic	and	social	recovery	that	became	evident	
in	 this	 period.	 This	 recovery	 generated	 concrete	 social	 effects	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 reduction	 of	
unemployment	 and	 poverty;	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 purchasing	 power	 of	 wages;	 and	 the	
strengthening	of	labor	guarantees	for	the	formal	sectors	of	the	labor	market.	In	this	economic	and	
social	scene,	 it	became	somewhat	more	difficult	 than	 in	 the	 recent	past	 for	street	crime	to	be	
transformed	 into	 a	 catalyst	 for	 widespread	 feelings	 of	 uncertainty,	 insecurity	 and	 social	
instability.	This	in	turn	could	have	been	supported	by	some	decline	of	these	forms	of	crime,	which	
coincidentally	can	be	observed	in	a	major	part	of	the	various	available	indicators	(Sozzo	2016a).	
	
Now,	what	happened	to	the	punitiveness	during	this	second	part	of	the	Kirchner	government?	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 incarceration,	 the	 numbers	 decreased	 from	 144	 inmates	 per	 100,000	
inhabitants	in	2005	to	133	prisoners	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	2007,	implying	a	decline	of	8	per	
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cent	in	two	years.	With	regard	to	convictions,	the	number	went	from	32,965	in	2005	–	of	which	
35	per	cent	of	the	convictions	were	of	conditional	compliance	and	65	per	cent	were	of	effective	
compliance	 –	 to	 29,804	 in	 2007,	 a	 decrease	 of	 10	per	 cent.	 In	 2007	 conditional	 and	 effective	
compliance	convictions	became,	respectively,	38	per	cent	and	62	per	cent.	In	2005	85	per	cent	of	
the	 sanctions	 were	 custodial,	 while	 the	 remaining	 15	 per	 cent	 were	 non‐custodial.	 These	
percentages	were	similar	in	2007.	In	2005,	the	custodial	sanctions	of	less	than	three	years	were	
66	per	cent	and	this	percentage	was	the	same	for	the	year	2007.	As	observed,	the	punitiveness	
between	2005	and	2007	did	not	grow,	with	some	of	the	available	indicators	even	showing	a	slight	
decline	 and,	 in	 so	 doing,	 breaking	 a	 trend	 that	 had	 been	 strong	 since	 the	mid‐1990s	 (Sozzo	
2016a).	
	
Crosscurrents	
With	the	inauguration	of	President	Cristina	Fernández	in	December	2007	a	new	moment	opened	
in	 the	development	 of	 Kirchnerism.	 This	 third	period	was	marked	by	 the	 consolidation	 of	 its	
‘national	 and	 popular’	 identity	 and,	 closely	 related	 to	 this,	 by	 the	 deepening	 of	 the	 social	
antagonisms	around	various	governmental	 initiatives	that	were	launched	as	central	themes	in	
the	political	and	public	debate.	The	first	initiative,	at	the	beginning	of	the	government	of	President	
Fernández	and	the	international	economic	crisis	of	2008,	was	the	attempt	to	increase	taxes	on	
the	export	of	cereal	products.	This	triggered	a	protest	from	various	agricultural	sectors,	especially	
by	the	large	and	medium	producers,	which	materialized	in	a	lockout	that	lasted	more	than	three	
months	 and	 was	 accompanied	 by	 roadblocks	 and	 strong	 public	 demonstrations	 that	 were	
supported	by	various	political	opposition	parties	and	sections	of	the	middle	classes.	In	the	end,	
the	Kirchnerism	proposal	was	defeated	by	a	key	vote	on	 the	matter	 in	 the	National	Congress,	
which	triggered	a	series	of	conflicts	within	the	alliance	that	resulted	in	its	weakening.	In	fact,	this	
defeat	 was	 directly	 tied	 to	 the	 alliance’s	 defeat	 in	 various	 jurisdictions	 during	 the	 legislative	
elections	of	2009.	Now,	from	this	moment	onward,	a	series	of	other	initiatives	were	launched:	the	
nationalization	of	Aerolineas	Argentinas	and	the	pension	system;	the	new	Broadcasting	Act;	the	
creation	of	 the	Universal	Assignation	per	Child,	a	 financial	aid	for	parents	of	children	from	12	
weeks	of	pregnancy	until	18	years	of	age;	unemployed	or	 informally	employed	whose	 income	
does	 not	 exceed	 the	minimum	wage;	 the	Marriage	 Equality	 Act;	 and	 so	 on.	 These	 initiatives	
generated	 various	 political	 triumphs,	 reinforced	 the	 postneoliberal	 elements	 of	 its	 political	
program,	and	reactivated	the	historical	binary	schemes	of	the	Argentinean	politics:	the	‘popular’	
and	the	‘anti‐popular’;	‘Peronism’	and	‘anti‐Peronism’.	The	death	of	Néstor	Kirchner	in	October	
2010	 had	 a	 very	 important	 effect.	 During	 2008	 and	 2009	 the	 Kirchnerist	 militancy	 had	
experienced	steady	growth,	but	this	event	triggered	additional	momentum	in	this	direction.	This	
reconstruction	of	Kirchnerism	after	the	electoral	defeat	in	2009	translated	into	a	victory	in	the	
2011	presidential	elections	in	which	Cristina	Fernández	was	re‐elected	with	54	per	cent	of	the	
votes,	a	higher	level	of	adherence	compared	to	that	of	2007	(Svampa	2011,	2013).	
	
Now,	these	last	years	were	strongly	marked	by	a	number	of	economic	problems	that	were	linked	
to	 the	 international	 economic	 crisis	 but	 also	 to	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 economic	 policies	
adopted	by	the	Kirchnerist	governments	since	2003.	Fundamentally,	this	was	crystallized	in	high	
inflation	and	in	its	impact	on	the	purchasing	power	of	wage	earners	which	was	partly	moderated,	
however,	 by	 annual	 wage	 increases	 between	 formal	 workers.	 But	 it	 was	 also	 translated	 as	
problems	 related	 to	 the	 exchange	 market	 and	 tax	 policy.	 Additionally	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	
national	 government,	 especially	 among	 the	middle	 classes,	was	 affected	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	
corruption	scandals	intensively	covered	by	the	mass	media,	particularly	by	those	enterprises	that	
opposed	this	governmental	alliance	and	program	(Svampa	2013).	 In	this	new	time	of	political	
weakness,	 Kirchnerism	 lost	 the	 legislative	 elections	 of	 October	 2013	 in	 the	 most	 important	
jurisdictions	but	remained	the	political	force	with	the	highest	number	of	votes	at	a	national	level	
even	though	the	numbers	were	far	from	the	levels	of	adhesion	during	the	presidential	elections.	
This	 political	 weakness	 spread	 during	 the	 final	 two	 years	 of	 the	 government	 of	 President	
Fernández	and	culminated	in	a	defeat	of	Kirchnerism	–	led	by	the	candidate	Daniel	Scioli	–	in	the	
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2015	general	election,	 in	the	runoff	against	the	 ‘Let’s	Change	Alliance’	 that	was	headed	by	the	
Republican	Proposal	(Propuesta	Republicana	or	PRO),	a	center‐right	political	party	that	emerged	
from	the	crisis	of	2001	and	was	driven	by	the	newly	elected	President	Mauricio	Macri.	
	
On	 a	national	 level,	 a	more	 ambiguous	 rhetoric	with	 regard	 to	 crime	 and	punishment	 can	be	
observed	 among	 key	 Kirchnerist	 actors	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 governments	 of	 President	
Fernández.	At	certain	times	and	on	certain	 issues	 it	 incorporated	elements	that	supported	the	
increase	of	penal	severity	–	such	as	the	need	to	be	more	restrictive	with	parole	or	the	decrease	of	
the	 minimum	 age	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 –	 but	 it	 never	 completely	 lost	 the	 fundamental	
features	that	were	previously	registered.	These	punitive	drifts	 in	the	official	rhetoric	occurred	
especially	in	times	of	political	weakness	such	as	during	the	campaigns	for	the	legislative	elections	
in	 2009	 and	 2013.	 Conversely,	 at	 a	 time	 of	 political	 strength	 during	 the	 campaign	 for	 the	
presidential	elections	in	2011,	the	tactics	of	this	political	alliance	presented	some	characteristics	
that	were	very	similar	to	those	of	the	2007	elections.	The	Kirchnerist	candidates,	especially	the	
President,	 took	 the	crime	problem	off	 center	stage	and	avoided	making	comments	 in	 favor	of	
increasing	 punitiveness.	 It	 is	 within	 this	 context	 that	 re‐election	 was	 achieved.	 In	 this	 way,	
Kirchnerism	demonstrated	through	three	consecutive	presidential	elections	that	it	was	possible	
to	win	these	kinds	of	electoral	disputes,	after	the	waves	of	penal	populism	of	the	late	1990s	and	
early	2000s,	without	raising	proposals	that	promoted	police	and	penal	hardening	(Sozzo	2016a).7	
	
Between	2008	and	2014	Kirchnerism	did	not	activate	any	initiatives	that	sought	to	increase	penal	
severity	similar	 to	 the	style	adopted	during	 the	preceding	waves	of	penal	populism,	with	 two	
exceptions.	Firstly,	there	was	the	failed	efforts	of	some	of	its	sectors	in	2009	to	achieve	a	law	on	
juvenile	criminal	responsibility,	a	complex	initiative	in	terms	of	its	orientation	but	that	included	
a	profile	of	penal	hardening.	However,	to	a	large	degree,	this	initiative	was	finally	not	approved	
by	the	opposition	of	the	Kirchnerist	sectors.	Secondly,	in	the	context	of	the	sanction	of	the	new	
Code	of	Criminal	Procedure	 for	 the	nation	 that	was	debated	and	 finally	 adopted	 in	December	
2014,	some	proposals	were	introduced	by	certain	Kirchnerist	sectors	that	were	clearly	punitivist	
with	regard	to	prison	on	remand	and	the	expulsion	of	undocumented	foreigners	in	cases	of	‘in	
flagrante	delicto’.	An	opposition	of	various	political	and	social	actors	managed	to	eliminate	some	
of	these	rules,	but	they	did	not	modify	other	problematic	points	in	the	formulation	of	this	new	
law	(Litvachky	and	Turfo	2015).	
	
The	 Kirchnerist	 political	 alliance	 did,	 however,	 support	 and	 promote	 a	 series	 of	 successful	
initiatives	 that	 increased	 punitiveness.	 Some	 had	 a	 certain	 practical	 impact	 but	 others	 were	
linked	to	crimes	whose	victims	were	predominantly	women,	children	and	adolescents,	and	were	
tied	to	scandals	related	to	specific	cases	widely	publicized	by	the	media,	and	with	pressures	from	
women's	movements	and	international	organizations.	In	part	these	penal	changes	had	different	
characteristics	than	those	generated	in	the	recent	past	even	though	they	shared	an	element	of	
increased	punitiveness,	including	the	central	figure	of	the	victim,	although	in	this	case	within	the	
context	of	inequalities	(of	gender,	between	age	groups)	and	constituting	an	attempt	to	denounce	
and	 reverse	 those	 inequalities.	 In	 this	 way,	 it	 promoted	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 2008	 law	 on	
Prevention	and	Punishment	of	Human	Trafficking	and	the	Assistance	of	 its	Victims,	with	2012	
reforms	 increasing	 sentence	 severity.	 Similarly,	 in	 late	 2012	 the	 alliance	 supported	 the	
introduction	of	a	form	of	‘femicide’	as	aggravated	homicide,	imposing	life	imprisonment.	Finally,	
the	reform	of	the	Penal	Execution	Law	with	regard	to	those	convicted	of	crimes	related	to	sexual	
integrity	in	2013	was	supported	by	the	Kirchnerist	political	alliance,	which	imposed	additional	
requirements	to	access	various	prison	benefits	and	parole.	
	
Simultaneously	 this	 governmental	 alliance	 promoted	 the	 enactment	 of	 some	 laws	 related	 to	
prison	 life,	 in	 which	 it	 sought	 to	 ameliorate	 the	 conditions	 of	 detention,	 albeit	 of	 a	 limited	
character.	In	this	way,	from	2009	it	became	possible	for	pregnant	women	or	women	with	children	
under	the	age	of	five	to	fulfil	their	imprisonment	in	the	form	of	house	arrest.	There	was	also	in	
2011	a	reform	of	the	legislation	on	penal	execution	in	order	to	improve	educational	services	in	
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prisons.	This	also	had	its	negative	side	as	it	again	included	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	education	
in	 the	 logic	of	 the	 rewards	 system	 that	was	 typical	 for	 the	 legal	prison	 regime	 in	 the	country	
(Gutiérrez	2012;	 Sozzo	 and	Ghiberto	2014).	 Lastly,	 in	2013	 the	 law	 that	 created	 the	national	
mechanism	for	the	prevention	of	torture	and	other	cruel	and	inhumane	treatments	was	approved	
(CELS	2009,	2011,	2012,	2013;	Litvachky	and	Asprela	2013).8	
	
The	most	prominent	initiative	in	terms	of	its	ambitions	in	this	direction	was	the	creation	of	a	new	
Commission	by	the	Executive	Power	for	the	development	of	a	draft	for	a	new	Criminal	Code	in	
2012,	presided	over	by	Judge	Eugenio	Zaffaroni,	a	clear	antagonist,	as	aforementioned,	against	
criminal	hardening.	The	Commission	was	not	compromised	of	experts	from	the	field	of	law	–	with	
the	 exception	 of	 Zaffaroni	 –	 but	 of	 prominent	 members	 of	 political	 parties	 with	 the	 largest	
presence	in	parliament	–	the	PRO,	the	Radical	Civic	Union,	the	Socialist	Party,	and	the	Justicialist	
Party	–	which	members	in	some	cases	had	a	professional	and	political	career	that	was	related	to	
the	penal	field.	This	Commission	unfolded	its	debate	in	a	reserved	space,	among	its	members	and	
advisors,	which	is	reminiscent	of	the	typical	mode	of	penal	policy‐making	during	the	first	stage	of	
the	transition	to	democracy	(Sozzo	2011a,	2011b,	2013).	But	there	was	a	fundamental	difference;	
namely,	 the	 significant	 weight	 of	 the	 ‘political	 arm’,	 in	 addition	 to	 a	 context	 in	 which	 the	
opposition	had	a	majority	position	over	the	ruling	party,	as	a	kind	of	legacy	of	the	politization	
process	of	crime	and	punishment	that	had	developed	since	the	mid‐1990s.	The	draft	for	the	new	
Criminal	Code	was	presented	to	the	Executive	Power	in	February	2014.	It	was	moderate	in	its	
orientation	 in	 some	 relevant	 aspects	 and	was	 immediately	 targeted	 by	 certain	 sectors	 of	 the	
political	opposition,	especially	by	the	Renewal	Front,	which	had	emerged	from	the	2013	elections	
as	a	detachment	of	Kirchnerism.	This	new	political	party	constructed	a	strong	campaign	against	
the	draft,	claiming	that	it	was	‘soft’	on	crime,	with	the	use	of	slogans,	such	as	‘No	to	the	new	Penal	
Code’	and	‘What	goes	around	comes	around’,	which	were	heavily	publicized	by	the	media.	The	
campaign	involved	the	collection	of	signatures	for	a	petition,	which	was	quite	unusual,	that	aimed	
for	the	National	Congress	not	to	address	the	proposal,	in	the	event	that	it	would	be	formed	into	a	
bill.	By	the	end	of	May	2014	more	than	two	million	signatures	were	presented.	This	led	to	other	
political	parties	such	as	the	Radical	Civil	Union	(UCR)	and	the	PRO	to	distance	themselves	from	
the	draft,	even	though	some	of	its	members	had	actively	participated	in	the	initiative.	Some	of	the	
sectors	of	the	Kirchnerist	alliance	even	sent	similar	messages	into	the	public	space.	As	a	result	the	
draft	was	completely	‘frozen’	in	the	context	of	a	new	general	election	campaign	(Litvachky	and	
Turfo	2015:	256‐257;	Sozzo	2016a:	237‐241).	
	
Now,	what	happened	 to	 the	punitiveness	during	 the	 administrations	of	President	Fernández?	
With	regard	to	imprisonment,	the	rate	increased	from	133	prisoners	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	
2007	to	162	prisoners	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	2014	–	the	last	available	year	for	data	–	which	
represents	an	increase	of	23	per	cent	in	seven	years,	to	reach	the	highest	rate	since	the	official	
start	of	these	statistics.	Convictions	increased	from	29,804	in	2007	to	33,688	in	2014,	an	increase	
of	13	per	cent	over	seven	years.	Of	these	convictions	38	per	cent	were	of	conditional	compliance	
and	62	per	cent	effective	compliance	in	2007.	In	2014	this	became,	respectively,	34	per	cent	and	
66	per	cent.	In	2007	custodial	sanctions	of	less	than	three	years	constituted	66	per	cent	of	the	
total;	this	fell	slightly	to	64	per	cent	in	2014.	As	shown,	punitivity	increased	in	Argentina	between	
2007	and	2014,	although	more	sharply	for	the	incarceration	rate	than	convictions	(Sozzo	2016a).	
	
To	conclude	
This	work	has	approached	the	relationship	in	Argentina	between	Kirchnerism	as	a	postneoliberal	
governmental	alliance	and	program,	and	penalty.	The	main	question	posed	was	to	what	extent	
did	this	political	change	bring	ruptures	to	the	dynamics	that	surrounded	the	penal	field	in	the	
recent	past,	especially	during	the	long	decade	of	neoliberal	reforms	from	1989,	with	the	rise	of	
Menemism,	until	the	economic	and	political	crisis	of	2001.	
	
Máximo	Sozzo: A	Postneoliberal	Turn?	Variants	of	the	Recent	Penal	Policy	in	Argentina 
	
IJCJ&SD						217	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(1)	
Vanessa	Barker	(2009:	13‐14,	170‐171,	180‐181)	has	insisted	on	the	issue	of	‘path	dependency’	
in	relation	to	penal	policy	in	her	analysis	of	penal	trajectories	of	certain	jurisdictions	in	the	United	
States.	In	other	words,	penalty	at	a	given	time	is	the	result	of	an	accumulation	of	decisions	and	
actions	that	have	unfolded	over	time	in	the	past	which	may	not	be	proximate	to	the	present	that	
we	are	trying	to	understand.	When	some	very	radical	changes	in	penal	policy	develop	within	a	
scenario,	a	kind	of	furrow	develops	from	which	it	 is	very	difficult	to	move.	Between	1992	and	
2002,	 the	 incarceration	 rate	 –	 not	 including	 processed	 and	 convicted	 individuals	 in	 police	
headquarters	and	precincts	–	grew	by	98	per	cent	in	Argentina;	the	number	of	convictions	grew	
by	38	per	cent;	the	percentage	of	suspended	sentences	as	part	of	the	total	number	of	convictions	
fell	by	26	per	cent	and	the	percentage	of	custodial	sanctions	of	less	than	three	years	as	part	of	the	
total	number	of	custodial	sanctions	decreased	by	12	per	cent.	
	
Obviously	the	challenge	of	reversing	such	a	punitive	turn	was	not	a	small	one.	But	the	exploration	
developed	here	shows	that	it	is	possible	in	certain	situations,	and	depending	on	certain	decisions	
and	actions	in	the	world	of	politics,	to	block	its	reproduction	and	even	initiate	an	opposite	course.	
Kirchnerism	 as	 a	 political	 alliance	 and	 program	 greatly	 contributed	 to	 the	 generation	 of	 the	
conditions	that	made	this	possible	between	2005	and	2007.	This	occurred	for	the	first	time	since	
the	 fall	of	 the	punitiveness	 indicators	 at	 the	 start	of	 the	 transition	 to	democracy	 in	Argentina	
between	1983	and	1984	 (Sozzo	2011a,	2011b,	2013).	 It	was	not	 so	much	because	direct	 and	
specific	 actions	 and	 initiatives	 were	 promoted	 in	 this	 direction,	 although	 some	 were,	 with	 a	
limited	scope.	This	outcome	was,	instead,	produced	indirectly	by	Kirchnerism,	by	filling	the	public	
and	political	debate	with	other	themes	that	were	related	to	its	political	program,	which	generated	
intense	 social	 conflicts	 and	 antagonists.	 In	 so	 doing,	 it	 displaced	 the	 crime	 problem	 from	 its	
previous	center‐stage,	a	 fruitful	position	 for	a	dynamic	of	penal	hardening	within	 the	game	of	
electoral	 and	 political	 competition.	 The	 process	 of	 economic	 recovery	 and	 its	 positive	 social	
effects,	 generated	 by	 post‐crisis	 public	 policies	 within	 a	 favorable	 international	 context,	 also	
contributed	 in	 this	 direction.	 This	 was	 by	 putting	 up	 barriers	 for	 the	 translation	 of	 social	
insecurity	concerns	–	in	the	form	of	anxieties	and	demands	around	insecurity	in	relation	to	street	
crime	–	to	which	the	slight	decrease	in	levels	of	street	crime	itself	might	also	have	contributed.	
This	‘virtuous’	result	occurred	despite	the	fact	that	this	political	alliance,	in	its	formative	stage,	
had	contributed	to	the	prolongation	of	the	punitive	turn	in	relation	to	a	wave	of	‘penal	populism	
from	below’.	 I	 think	 that	 it	 is	 as	 important	 to	 analyze	why	 a	 punitive	 turn	 does	 not	 occur,	 is	
interrupted	or	reversed	in	different	scenarios	as	it	is	to	describe	and	understand	it,	and	already	
there	exists	an	emerging	literature	on	the	subject	(Nelken	2005;	O’Malley	and	Meyer	2005;	Pratt	
2007,	2008a,	2008b;	Van	Swaaningen	2013).	
	
From	then	on	this	political	alliance	has	followed	a	path	traversed	by	tensions	and	contradictions,	
tied	 largely	 to	 its	moments	 of	 political	 and	 electoral	 weakness	 and	 strength,	 but	 also	 to	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 its	 composition,	 especially	 in	 certain	 provincial	 jurisdictions,	 something	 not	
explored	 in	detail	here	 (see,	 instead,	 Sozzo	2016b).9	This	 implies	 recognizing	 the	volatile	and	
ambiguous	nature	of	the	relationship	between	this	postneoliberal	political	alliance	and	the	penal	
field,	which	is	connected	to	its	lack	of	definition	and	uniformity	within	this	slippery	terrain.	This	
was	possible	because	crime	and	punishment	were	not	a	central	part	of	the	postneoliberal	promise	
around	 which	 this	 governmental	 alliance	 and	 program	 was	 historically	 constructed.	 As	 a	
consequence,	various	segments	of	this	alliance	advanced	different	proposals	and	initiatives	that	
spoke	to	partially	dissimilar	political	and	electoral	audiences,	at	times	creating	a	positive	result	
in	terms	of	adhesion,	sometimes	out	of	‘convenience’	and	sometimes	out	of	‘conviction’.	Perhaps	
we	could	even	extend	this	consideration	to	all	contemporary	political	alliances,	if	we	look	at	Pat	
O’Malley’s	(1999)	contribution	about	the	relationship	between	penal	policy	and	the	New	Right	
that	has	been	crucial	in	the	construction	of	the	perspective	of	this	paper.	O'Malley,	looking	at	the	
heterogeneity	of	political	alliances	in	relation	to	penalty,	emphasized	its	link	to	the	co‐presence	
of	different	governmental	rationalities	–	in	his	case,	neoliberalism	and	neo‐conservatism	–	and	
not	 so	 much	 to	 the	 weight	 of	 ‘pragmatism’,	 ‘contingencies’	 and	 ‘junctures’,	 although	 he	 also	
assigns	them	a	certain	role	(O’Malley	1999:	185).	But	more	recently	he	has	also	emphasized	the	
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open,	permeable	and	labile	nature	of	governmental	rationalities,	while	avoiding	to	paint	them	as	
free	of	conflict	and	internal	inconsistencies	(O’Malley	2004,	2015).	It	is	crucial	for	our	objectives	
in	this	paper	that	such	conflicts	and	tensions	between	governmental	rationales	or	within	the	same	
governmental	rationality	are	not	necessarily	a	matter	of	instability	but	may	even	contribute	to	
the	strength	of	an	alliance	in	contemporary	democratic	politics	(O’Malley	2004).	The	insistence	
by	O’Malley	(2004:	185,	192)	that	changes	that	occur	 ‘cannot	be	reduced	to	the	 level	of	party	
politics’	 in	 my	 opinion	 largely	 reflects	 the	 spatial	 and	 temporal	 circumstances	 of	 their	
observations:	the	erosion	of	borders	in	programmatic	terms	between	the	major	political	parties	
in	 English‐speaking	 countries	 like	 the	 United	 States,	 Great	 Britain,	 Australia	 or	 New	 Zealand,	
especially	 in	 the	 last	 25	 years.	 This	 seems	 difficult	 to	 sustain	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 wave	 of	
postneoliberal	changes	in	South	America	–	especially	in	their	most	radical	forms	–	beyond	the	
cautious	interpretation	that	we	have	developed	in	relation	to	the	rhetorical	claims	around	these	
mutations.	
	
I	think	that	the	history	of	the	relationship	between	Kirchnerism	and	the	penal	 field	shows	the	
weight	of	the	junctures	in	the	logic	of	contemporary	democratic	politics,	such	as	the	role	of	the	
public	scandals	around	specific	cases	in	the	unfolding	of	the	waves	of	penal	populism	(Loader	and	
Sparks	2004;	Pratt	2007;	Zimring	1996).	This	 gives	 rise	 to	a	 certain	 ‘pragmatism’	by	political	
actors	who	try	to	capture	the	‘voter	as	a	consumer’	–	and	no	longer	through	a	‘grand	narrative’	–	
(Ryan	2005:	143)	even	in	the	context	of	postneoliberal	change	processes.	In	this	sense,	I	consider	
the	key	interpretive	point	by	Joachim	Savelsberg	about	the	‘historical	contingencies’	(2004:	374,	
389‐391;	see	also,	Savelsberg	2002;	for	the	Argentine	case,	but	in	relation	to	the	first	moment	of	
transition	to	democracy,	see	Sozzo	2011b;	2013)	to	be	useful	when	thinking	about	the	patterns	
of	 contemporary	 punishment,	 understood	 as	 ‘events	 that	 are	 largely	 unpredictable	 for	 social	
theory	 but	 nevertheless	 bring	 consequences	with	 it’.	 Of	 course,	 it	 also	means	 taking	 the	 role	
played	 by	 moments	 of	 strength	 and	 political	 weakness	 of	 governmental	 alliances	 into	
consideration.	In	particular,	crises	of	confidence	and	legitimacy	can	impact	government	decisions	
and	actions	in	the	penal	field	in	unpredictable	ways	(Barker	2009;	Sparks	2003a,	2003b;	Pratt	
2007).	
	
It	turns	out	to	be	difficult	to	undo	what	has	been	done.	The	incarceration	rate	between	2002	and	
2014	grew	by	32	per	cent	in	the	country.	Meanwhile	the	rate	of	convictions	increased	by	32	per	
cent;	the	percentage	of	suspended	sentences	as	part	of	the	total	convictions	fell	by	19	per	cent	
and	the	percentage	of	custodial	sanctions	of	 less	 than	 three	years	as	part	of	 the	 total	number	
custodial	sanctions	decreased	by	11	per	cent.	Especially	in	relation	to	incarceration,	these	levels	
of	 increase	 are	 not	 as	 stark	 as	 those	 of	 the	 preceding	 decades.	 However,	 the	 trend	 persists.	
Therefore,	the	question	of	how	to	transcend	the	dynamics	of	the	punitive	turn	remains	a	pending	
and	urgent	political	subject.	
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1	This	article	was	originally	published	in	Spanish	(available	at	
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/gt/20160404115404/Postneoliberalismo_penalidad.pdf)	and	was	translated	
for	this	special	issue.	
2	I	have	worked	on	the	emergence	of	this	punitive	turn	in	Argentina	from	the	mid‐1990s	onwards	as	part	of	a	more	
general	overview	of	the	field	of	crime	control	(Sozzo	2005,	2012)	and	in	relation	to	the	changes	inside	prisons	(Sozzo	
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2007,	2009).	More	recently,	I	have	addressed	this	issue	in	more	depth	in	relation	to	the	notion	of	‘penal	populism’	
(Sozzo	2016a,	2016b)	
3	The	role	of	referenda	and	citizen’s	initiatives	in	the	production	of	waves	of	penal	populism	has	been	analysed	in	other	
contexts	(see	Pratt	2007;	Pratt	and	Clark	2005;	Zimring	1996).	
4	The	Axel	Crusade	involved	the	consolidation	of	a	trend	whose	symptoms	were	first	observed	in	the	late	1990s.	Until	
then,	the	place	of	the	‘victim’	as	a	source	of	social	and	political	mobilization	in	the	Argentinean	public	and	political	
debate	had,	since	the	beginning	of	the	transition	to	democracy,	been	occupied	by	the	‘victims	of	power’.	In	the	first	
place	 and	par	 excellence,	 there	were	 those	who	had	experienced	 the	 crimes	of	 the	 state	during	 the	 last	military	
dictatorship	and	who	had	given	rise	to	a	rich	network	of	organizations	and	social	movements	since	the	1970s.	Next,	
consider	the	victims	of	police	and	institutional	violence	in	the	democratic	context,	since	the	‘slaughter	of	Ingeniero	
Budge’	in	1987	and	the	cases	of	Walter	Bulacio	and	Miguel	Bru	in	1991,	which	led	to	various	organizations	and	social	
movements.	But	there	have	also	been	other	‘crimes	of	the	powerful’	that	were	linked	to	the	political	elites,	from	the	
case	of	Maria	Soledad	Morales	 in	1991	to	the	case	of	 José	Luis	Cabezas	 in	1997,	which	also	 led	to	political	social	
activation	(Gingold	1997;	Grimson	and	Kessler	2005;	Pita	2010).	Compared	to	these	precedents,	the	Axel	Crusade	
consolidated	the	reference	to	the	‘victims	of	insecurity’,	to	the	victims	of	‘street	crime’	that	contains	a	generic	appeal	
‐	‘we	can	all	be	victims’‐	and	tended	to	publicly	prevail	other	possible	incarnations	of	this	figure	although,	of	course,	
not	completely	(see	Gutiérrez	2006,	2010;	and	especially	the	detailed	analysis	of	this	‘dispute’	in	Schillagi	2009).	
5	 There	 is,	 of	 course,	 the	 complex	 question	 around	 how	 to	 discern	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 changes	 in	 these	 various	
punitiveness	indicators	resulted	from	this	new	wave	of	penal	populism	and	not	because	of	other	variables	that	could	
be	lost	from	our	sight	when	we	focus	on	this	process.	Considering	that	this	process	played	a	key	role	in	this	evolution,	
this	does	not	imply	ruling	out	other	elements	that	can	contribute	to	its	understanding	(Sozzo	2016a).	
6	With	the	exception	of	the	enactment	of	the	so‐called	Antiterrorist	Law	in	2007,	with	the	consent	of	the	Executive	
Power	 and	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 Kirchnerist	 legislators.	 The	 legal	 text	 was	 criticized	 by	 numerous	 human	 rights	
organizations	 as	well	 as	by	professors	of	 criminal	 law.	But	 it	was	a	 largely	 symbolic	 initiative	because	 it	 had	no	
practical	impact	until	today.	
7	However,	partly	in	tension	with	this	dynamic	at	a	national	level,	since	his	inauguration	as	the	Governor	of	the	Province	
of	Buenos	Aires	in	late	2007,	Daniel	Scioli	and	his	governmental	alliance,	still	within	the	context	of	Kirchnerism,	gave	
very	clear	signs	that	they	would	put	the	crime	problem	at	the	center	of	their	agenda	and	would	promote	police	and	
penal	hardening,	which	gave	this	governmental	alliance	during	this	third	moment	a	strong	level	of	heterogeneity	–	
and	not	only	in	this	area	–	across	the	national	and	provincial	levels.	This	heterogeneity	was	extended	and	deepen	in	
2015	when	the	Governor	became	the	presidential	candidate	of	Kirchnerism	(Sozzo	2016a).	
8	 In	 the	policing	 field,	 the	revival	of	a	 reformist	 impulse	could	be	mentioned	 in	 late	2010,	with	 the	creation	of	 the	
national	Ministry	of	Security,	with	ambitious	prospects	but	only	 limitedly	deployed	 in	2011	and	2012	and	with	a	
sharp	decline	in	the	last	three	years	(CELS	2012,	2013;	Sain	2012a,	2012b;	Sozzo	2014).	
9	This	ratifies	the	importance	of	exploring	the	weight	of	the	sub‐national	politics	in	federal	states	like	Argentina	when	
fully	trying	to	grasp	the	link	between	politics	and	penalty,	given	that	there	can	exist	sources	of	divergence	between	
the	federal	and	provincial	levels	‐	as	has	been	sustained	in	the	case	of	the	United	States,	among	others	(Barker	2006,	
2009;	Beckett	and	Western	2001;	Greenberg	and	West	2001;	Lynch	2009,	2011;	Miller	2008;	Newburn	2010;	Sasson	
2000;	Sheingold	1991).	
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